Abstract. This paper investigates the effects of analyst forecasts on management earnings forecasts in Chinese forecasting environment. The empirical results show that: The pessimistic forecasts bias encourage listed firms disclose earnings forecasts more timely and accurate to correct the market expectation of earnings; managers will make more précised forecasts when analyst forecasts dispersions are high. The results imply that, analyst forecasts have great impacts on management earnings forecasts, which is not only restricted by government, but also affected by other market participants. This paper sheds new light on the research on the relationship between analyst forecasts and management earnings forecasts in China.
Introduction
As two main and important sources of earnings forecast information for listed firms in developed market, the interaction between analyst forecasts and management earnings forecasts can improve the quality of earnings forecasting information efficiently, which in turn, provide more reliable information to investors (Kasznik and McNichols, 2002) . Also, analyst forecasts driven by capital market can viewed as the substitute of regulation with lower cost to restrict manager behavior (Yu, 2008; McInnis and Collins, 2011) .
In China, the forecasting information is provided along with management earnings forecasts. Chinese government requires firms issue management earnings forecasts mandatorily when firms anticipate losses, turning profit, changes in earnings up to 50% compared to earnings in previous year. Otherwise, managers are allowed to decide whether to issue forecasts voluntarily. Compared to developed market, management earnings forecasts timeliness are pretty lower, the information provided by manager are more like "pre-announcement" rather than "forecasting", which lead to the circumstance that analyst forecasts will issued before management earnings forecasts and generates market expectation. In this Chinese forecasting information environment, it will be interesting to exam that whether manage will "correct" market expectation generated from analyst forecasts through management earnings forecasts.
Institutional Background and Hypothesis Development
In December 2000, Chinese stock exchanges started to require firms to issue warnings if they anticipate losses for the year. The exchanges reaffirmed or updated their disclosure requirements each year afterwards. In 2002, the exchanges expanded the scope of mandatory forecasts to include forecasts of significant earnings changes (specifically, earnings increase or decreases of at least 50% from the previous year). The stock exchanges also impose forecast deadlines and provide forecast forms to standardize the practice. The implemention of this regulation makes Chinese capital market to be a unique information environment. First, we can observe both mandatory forecasts and voluntary forecasts in the same market. Second, for forecast timeliness, even though regulator asks listed firms issue forecasts at the 3rd quarter financial report, it also poses the deadline of forecasts, which is 30 days after fiscal year end. It means that Chinese listed firms can issue forecasts after fiscal year end, which make a remarkable difference in forecasting timeliness for China and other developed country. Last, managers can discrete forecast form such as forecast precision and accuracy. Timely management earnings forecasts can provide firm-level information which helps analysts make more accurate forecasts (Hassel et al., 1988 ). However, due to the week timeliness of management earnings forecasts, the interaction between analyst forecasts and management earnings forecasts in China is different from developed market. Table 1 show the statistic of the initial forecasts issued by managers and analysts from 2004 to 2011. As can be seen from Table 1 , the earliest forecast issued at the very beginning of the year, while the latest forecast issued around 3 months after fiscal year end, which is even later than the deadline of mandatory forecasts. However, when we look at analyst forecasts, the timeliness for them are pretty close to which in America capital market, which are more timely than management earnings forecasts. The timeliness difference between management earnings forecasts and analyst forecasts leads to that, information from analyst forecasts are come to the market participants earlier than management earnings forecasts to make market expectation.
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
Manager will do "expectation management" to "walk down" optimistic analyst forecasts, so as to "meet" or "beat" analyst forecasts to get market benefits in emerging market. (Bartov et al., 2002) . In China, with the relatively weaker investor protection, relatively lower litigation and reputation cost can restrict and motivate managers to make voluntary disclosure (Wong and Piotroski, 2012). However, the intensive competition and market reward around the good news disclosure, stimulate Chinese listed firms to release good news rather than bad news, leading to a relatively low incentive for firms to release good news than good news (Zhang et al., 2011) . In this information disclosure information, optimistic analyst forecasts will boom capital market with the lower cost of market punishment, listed firms can "stay silent" to enjoy the positive market benefits created from optimistic analyst forecasts. However, the pessimitic analyst forecasts will not only bring negative market effects but also enhance investors′ expectation of bad performance. Therefore, when analyst forecasts are pessimitic (lower) then realized earnings, managers will have higher incentive to "correct" the negative market expectation. Firms may choose to issue more accurate forecasts timely to response to pessimitic analyst forecasts to convey good news to market participants to get abnormal returns and correct pessimitic market expectation. Based on the analysis above, we propose our first hypothesis:
H1: The pessimitic analyst forecasts issued before management earnings foercasts can improve the timeliness and accuracy of management earnings forecasts.
The quality of analyst forecasts have great impact on investment decision rely on analyst forecasts. Higher analyst forecasts dispersion indicates the firm-level information analysts can get is less, and the information asymmetry between market and firms are getting higher, which can lead to stock price fluctuation (Marquardt and Wiedman, 1998) . When analyst forecasts dispersion is high, we expect that firms will have higher incentives to improve forecast precision to lower the market uncertainty, to convey more precise firm-level information, to help analysts make more consistent forecasts. Therefore, we propose our second hypothesis:
H2: The higher dispersion of analyst forecasts issued before management earnings foercasts is, the more precise of management earnings forecasts will be.
Data and Research Design
Our sample is selected from all A-share firms listed in Chinese stock market from 2004 to 2011, considering the earnings instability of IPO firms and the special earnings structure of financial firms, we delete IPO firms each year and financial firms from our raw sample. All the management earnings forecasts data come from RESSET database, analyst forecasts data and firm characteristic data come from CSMAR database.
For dependent variables, we define TIMELINESS to measure the timeliness of forecasts, it equals the days between initial management earnings forecasts and fiscal year end (December 31st each year) , we define PRECISION to capture the precision of management earnings forecasts. For independent variables, we define AF_BIAS and AF_DISPER to proxy analyst forecasts bias and dispersion, respectively. We use analyst forecasts issued 30 days earlier than initial management earnings forecasts to calculate AF_BIAS and AF_DISPER. We also follow extant infomation disclosure literature, select firm size, SOE, Tobin Q, the standard deviation of the firm's ROA from past five years, the industrial competition, the shares owned by institutional investors, the concentrate of equity holders, financing needs, and the development of market in each province as control variables.
For H1, we establish Eq. 1 and Eq. 2 to exam the relationships between analyst forecast bias and the timeliness as well as accuracy of management earnings forecasts. For H2, we establish Eq. 3 to exam the relationship between analyst forecast dispersion and the precison of management earnings forecast.
(1) 
Empirical Results
The coefficient for AF_BIAS of Model (1) and Model (3) are significantly positive, which indicates that the timeliness of management earnings forecasts are more timely for firms with pessimistic market expectation than those with optimistic market expectation from analyst forecast. This results imply that, Chinese listed firms are eager to "correct" the negative market expectation, which is contrary to developed market, where listed firms are more likely to "walk down" market expectation timely. Model (2) and Model (4) tests the impact of analysts forecasts bias on the accuracy of management earnings forecasts. The coefficient for AF_BIAS of Model (2) and Model (4) are significantly negative, which indicates that, the accuracy of management earnings forecasts are higher when market expecatation is pessimistic.The results above are all consistent with hypothesis 1, which imply that Chinese listed firms will correct negative market expectation from analyst forecasts by issuing more timely and accurate management earnings forecasts. Model (5) and Model (6) exam the effects of analyst forecasts dispersion on the precision of management earnings forecasts for manadatory forecasrts and voluntary forecasts, respectively. The coefficients of AF_DISPER are both significantly positive in the two models, which demostreate that, firms will improve their forecast precision to lower analyst forecasts dispersion, so as to lower market uncertainty. The results are consistent with hypothesis 2. Note: For Model (5) and Model (6), we use Ordered Probit regression. We report z-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Robust Test
The extant literature indicates that, managers will lead analyst issued earnings forecasts with lower number than realized earning though expectation management to avoid unexpected earnings (Matsumoto, 2002) . Even though we take the analyst forecasts issued before management earnings forecasts to avoid the possible expectation management, it may not prevent managers to "meet" or "beat" lower analyst forecasts after expectation management. In robust test, we exclude the latest analyst forecasts before management earnings forecasts with lower expectation and redo the tests, the regression results are shown in Table 3 . The results are similar with Table 2 , out results are still hold when we excluded possible manager expectation management. 
Conclusion
This paper investigates the impact of analysis forecasts on management earnings forecasts for Chinese listed firms. We point out that, compared with developed capital market, the market expection are mainly driven by analyst forecasts since analyst forecasts are more timely than management earnings forecasts. In this unique information environment, we exam the impacts of analyst forecasts characteristics on different types of management earnings forecasts. The empirical results show that, pessimistic analyst forecasts issued before management earnings forecasts will improve the timeliness and accuracy of management earnings forecasts, which imply that Chinese listed firms have the incentive to correct the negative market expectation through timely and accurate forecasts. Meanwhile, we found that, higher dispersion of analyst forecasets will bring more precised management earnings forecasts. Our research demonstrates that, analyst forecasts have great impact on management earnings forecasts for Chinese listed firms. The forecasting behavior for Chinese listed firms do not only regulated by government but also affected by other market participants.
The interaction between analyst forecasts and management earnings forecasts can improve forecast information environment. Therefore, regulator can implement more flexible regulation, encouraging the mutual governance for all the participants in Chinese capital market, let "invisible hand" to improve our information environment.
